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Abstract
Digital systems give rise to complex layered architectures in which products at one
layer serve as platforms for applications and services in adjacent layers. Platform owners
face a difficult balancing act. On one hand, they need to make their platforms attrac-
tive to potential complementors by mitigating the threat of architectural lock-in. On the
other hand, platform owners must be careful not to give away too much too soon, or
risk being unable to recoup their own investments. This paper presents an agent-based
model that explores this tension at both the firm and industry levels. Computational ex-
periments show that boundedly rational platform owners learn to attract complementors
by voluntarily limiting their exercise of architectural control. When rents from architec-
tural control are strongly appropriable, firms enjoy substantial early-mover advantages.
Later entrants do surprisingly well, however, because they are able to be more selective
in choosing product niches to develop. The model highlights the underappreciated role of
product architecture in mediating the relationship between firm strategy and competitive
outcomes, and suggests that deeper architectures—which are fostered by more “open”
technologies and practices—may enhance industry innovation and profitability.
Key words: IT impacts on industry and market structure; competitive aspects of IS;
product architecture; computational simulation
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1 Introduction
Technology strategists have observed that among producers of digital goods and systems, the
most successful firms tend to be those that establish a position of leadership with respect to
a platform, “an evolving system made of interdependent pieces that can each be innovated
upon” (Gawer and Cusumano 2002, pp. 2–3). To do this, a firm must design its products to
serve as a foundation for products created by others. But good design is rarely enough. The
firm must also create incentives for others to pursue the opportunities it creates, stimulating
the growth of a network of competitors and complementors—a “business ecosystem”—with
itself in the role of a hub or “keystone species” (Iansiti and Levien 2004). Moreover, for
long-term success the firm must sustain its position over time, staving off rivals’ efforts to
commoditize the core components of its platform (Christensen and Raynor 2003, ch. 6).
Aspiring platform leaders thus face a difficult balancing act. On one hand, they
need to make their platforms attractive to potential complementors. This typically entails
reducing the amount of investment needed to participate (e.g., by providing tools and docu-
mentation) as well as mitigating the fear of architectural lock-in (e.g., by giving up control
of key technologies). On the other hand, knowing that advantage is always temporary (Fine
1998), platform owners must be careful not to give too much away too soon, or risk being
unable to recoup their own investments. This paper explores the tension between platform
owners and their complementors using an agent-based model of competition in an evolving
digital system.
While a large body of research articulates the basic forces of platform competition,
relatively little examines how they interact, especially in complex software-intensive systems.
David Stutz, formerly Group Program Manager for Technical Strategy at Microsoft, describes
the nested platform structure of these systems:
Platforms exist at many layers of a software system, and slowly come and go
as their usefulness waxes and wanes over many product cycles. Programs like
[Ray] Ozzie’s Groove and Notes, Microsoft Office, or even Nullsoft’s Winamp
are application-level platforms. The Java API, coupled with a Java virtual ma-
chine, is a middleware platform, as is Microsoft’s Common Language Runtime
and its managed libraries. Windows and Linux, of course, are operating system
platforms. Even low-level device subsystems can . . . rely upon platform-like dy-
namics to sustain their obscure (if not lively) ecosystems. (Stutz 2004)
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Stutz emphasizes the duality of applications and platforms: a product may be an application
from the perspective of a lower-level platform and at the same time a platform for higher-level
applications.
This paper contributes to our understanding of competition in digital systems by
studying the dynamics of architectural control and value migration using computational sim-
ulation experiments. I ask and answer two basic questions about platform-producing indus-
tries: What conditions lead them to be vibrant and profitable, and how can firms successfully
compete in them? I embrace the tradition of formal economic modeling by rendering explicit
the incentives and interactions among firms, but extend this tradition by situating the firms
in an evolving system whose architecture is determined, in part, by the firms’ strategic deci-
sions. Even in the simplified setting of the model, these decisions are intractably complex for
standard analytic tools. I therefore eschew the typical assumptions of equilibrium behavior
in favor of a constructive approach in which firms learn from the past and form expectations
about the future.
The experiments show that firms in the model are responsive to industry conditions
and effective at exploiting profitable product development opportunities. Platform owners
learn to attract complementors by voluntarily limiting their exercise of architectural control.
When rents from architectural control are strongly appropriable, firms enjoy substantial early-
mover advantages. Later entrants do surprisingly well, however, because they are able to be
more selective in choosing product niches to develop. When it is possible to commoditize
incumbent platforms through cloning, entrant firms often do so even when it is costly, causing
value to migrate “up the stack” to applications and application-level platforms. The model
highlights the underappreciated role of product architecture in mediating the relationship be-
tween firm strategy and competitive outcomes, and suggests that deeper architectures—which
are fostered by more “open” technologies and practices—may enhance industry innovation
and profitability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates this work by placing
it in the context of related research on platforms and competition. Section 3 presents the
basic model and the experimental design. Sections 4 and 5 report the results at the firm and
industry levels, respectively. Section 6 presents an extension to the model in which a firm can
clone the interface of an incumbent platform, enabling the creation of compatible substitutes.
Section 7 discusses the robustness of the results, their relationship to economic concepts of
equilibrium and efficiency, and opportunities for future work. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Platform Battles and Technology Wars
In an influential Harvard Business Review article, Morris and Ferguson (1993) advanced the
proposition that “architecture wins technology wars.” Specifically, they argued that “com-
petitive success flows to the company that manages to establish proprietary architectural
control over a broad, fast-moving, competitive space” (1993, p. 87), and that such control,
contrary to conventional wisdom, is in the best interest of both firms and consumers. Al-
though Morris and Ferguson crystallized one side of an ongoing debate, they were neither the
first to assert the importance of architecture in high-technology competition nor the last to
explore the costs and benefits of platform ownership. Their perspective is notable, however,
in anticipating a major theme of the more recent literature on competitive dynamics (Smith
et al. 2001; Ketchen et al. 2004): that a key source of competitive advantage is the ability to
execute an appropriate sequence of strategic moves and countermoves in a rapidly changing
competitive environment. They note that proprietary system architectures “are under con-
stant competitive attack and must be vigorously defended. It is this dynamic that compels
a very rapid pace of technological improvement” (1993, p. 89).
2.1 The Dynamics of Platform Competition
The particular moves available to firms in platform industries have attracted scholarly in-
terest since the mid-1980s, when industrial organization economists began studying issues
of standardization, compatibility, and architectural control in multi-product systems. The
ensuing literature on network economics and systems competition focused on the coordina-
tion problems that arise in markets for technologically interdependent products (Katz and
Shapiro 1994). This literature examines a variety of strategic decisions, including compatibil-
ity choice (Katz and Shapiro 1985), bundling and unbundling (Matutes and Regibeau 1988,
1992), and the creation of switching costs (Farrell and Shapiro 1988) and converters (Farrell
and Saloner 1992), using stylized two-firm / two-product game-theoretic models.
Other scholars have taken a complementary approach, seeking to explain broad fea-
tures of system industries that have persisted over time, like concentration around a dominant
platform punctuated by occasional bursts of innovation and intense competition. Bresnahan
and Greenstein (1999) observed the emergence of a “platform of platforms” based on net-
work computing technologies, and predicted that forces for industry concentration will remain
strong even as the era of monopoly dominance gives to way to a regime of “divided technical
leadership” in which architectural control devolves from integrated system providers like IBM
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to providers of platform components like Intel and Microsoft. Malerba et al. (1999, 2001)
explored this hypothesis using a “history-friendly” model of the computer industry. In their
model, firms develop technological and marketing competencies through investments in R&D
and advertising, while using these competencies to create products that differ in price and
performance. By varying parameters of the model, Malerba et al. achieved both “history-
replicating” and “history-divergent” model behavior, thus shedding light on the actual path
of the industry as well as outcomes that might have occurred under different conditions (e.g.,
if mainframe customers had been less susceptible to lock-in, or microprocessors had appeared
before a dominant mainframe firm emerged).
2.2 The Architecture of Platforms
A related line of work in technology management has explored the role of product and system
architecture in shaping the behavior and performance of innovative firms. In his seminal
research on decision-making in engineering design, Marples (1961) observed a correspondence
between the typical sequence of design decisions in an engineering project and the hierarchical
structure of the artifact being designed. Clark (1985) invoked the same hierarchical structure
to account for patterns of design evolution over successive product generations. Henderson
and Clark (1990), building on these insights, offered a theory and evidence to explain the
failure of incumbent firms in the face of architectural innovation. While Henderson and
Clark focused on the fates of individual firms, Baldwin and Clark (2000) took their analysis
to the industry level, tracing the impact of firms’ design decisions on the cluster of industries
that have grown up around computers since the 1960s. Tushman and Murmann (1998)
and Murmann and Frenken (2005) connected this work back to the literature on dominant
designs and the product life cycle (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Anderson and Tushman
1990; Suarez 2004) by viewing technological change as a recursive process that plays out in
parallel across hierarchically nested subsystems.
Like the literature from industrial economics, the technology management literature
offers theoretical insights and empirically testable propositions that can shed light on plat-
form competition in digital systems. Ideas from the two streams of research are difficult
to synthesize, however, because they “black box” different aspects of reality to achieve con-
ceptual parsimony. The economic literature tends to emphasize the details of the agents’
incentives and behavior while abstracting away from the technological complexity of the sys-
tems they create and use. Technology management scholars tend to paint with a broader
brush, using verbal theories backed by descriptive evidence to a greater extent than formal
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models in order to understand the more diffuse phenomena of technological evolution and
firm performance. As a result, we still lack a comprehensive framework to reason about the
phenomena Morris and Ferguson called attention to fifteen years ago, namely the strategic
consequences of architectural decisions in a dynamic industry environment.
2.3 Bringing Together Structure and Dynamics
This paper offers a tentative step toward bringing architectural strategy and competitive
dynamics into the same conceptual picture. I model the evolving architecture of a digital
system using an explicit mathematical representation, so that in principle a firm’s strategic
situation can be represented as a normal-form game. But I want to study the dynamics
of these systems as they grow from a single platform product to a multi-product system
comprising on the order of a hundred interdependent platforms and applications, arranged in
perhaps up to a dozen architectural layers—a situation more familiar to technology strategists
at Microsoft, IBM, Apple, or Google than the “toy models” of the existing literature. This
would, of course, be analytically intractable using standard game-theoretic techniques.
I therefore turned to computational simulation, which imposes the same burden of for-
malizing one’s assumptions as a game theory model, yet permits detailed analysis of complex
dynamics over a large parameter space.1 These dynamics are rich enough to yield emergent
phenomena like commoditization and value migration, while ensuring it is always possible
to determine the causal mechanisms responsible for them. This is the first model, to my
knowledge, in which firms reason strategically about architectural decisions that affect the
open-ended evolution of a system.
3 A Model of Platform Competition in an Evolving
Digital System
Consider an industry in which firms create products that are designed to be combined into
systems by consumers. Section 3.1 defines systems, their components, and the relationships
between components. Section 3.2 describes how systems evolve, how they create value for
users, and how this value is captured by firms. Section 3.3 specifies the firms’ behavior,
including the way they learn from the experience of prior entrants. Section 3.4 describes the
computational experiments I conducted using the model.
1On the use of agent-based computational models in the social sciences, including detailed discussion of
their benefits and limitations, see Epstein (2006) and Miller and Page (2007).
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3.1 Products and Dependencies
A system is a collection of components that are designed to work together. A component
is a technologically and economically discrete part of a system. Components are typically
realized as products or services sold by firms. Many other kinds of artifacts can also serve as
components (for example, standards specifications, open-source software libraries, and user-
generated extensions) but for simplicity I will use the terms “product” and “component”
interchangeably, and refer to the agents in the model as firms.
Every product occupies a product category. Products in the same category are eco-
nomic substitutes: they deliver similar functionality and compete in the same market. Each
product category is associated with a use value that represents the total willingness to pay
of all buyers, aggregated across all products in the category. Because they are system com-
ponents, products are interdependent on each other. I focus on design dependencies, i.e.,
information that a designer of a new product needs to know about an existing one in order
to make the new product work correctly with it. Following the transaction-cost economics
literature (e.g., Teece 1986), dependencies may be either generic or specialized. Figure 1
illustrates this distinction.
In the generic case, dependent components make use of information that is common
to a product category (web browsers, in the example of the figure) but not specific to a par-
ticular product (e.g., Firefox or Internet Explorer), resulting in compatibility across products
in the category. In the specialized case, component designers use product-specific design
information, yielding applications that are tightly bound to a particular product platform
(e.g., Outlook for Windows and Entourage for the Mac). Dependent products are economic
complements—applications increase the value of platforms and vice versa—with the special
property that an application has no value in the absence of a platform, while a platform
may have some value in the absence of applications. (Chen and Nalebuff 2007 coin the term
“one-way essential complements” to describe this situation.)
Generic dependence is common among simple tools. For example, most cooking pots
can be used on both gas or electric stoves, because the interface between stove and pot
is simple and well understood by makers of both. For more complex engineered systems,
dependence tends to be specialized unless a deliberate effort has been made to decouple
architectural layers from each other, e.g., by adopting a common standard such as HTML. In
reality, the degree of specialization between applications and platforms is often endogenous
and may change over time. As noted by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and further investigated
by Farrell and Saloner (1992), compatibility can often be achieved at some cost, whether
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Figure 1: Generic and specialized dependence among products in a system.
by adopting a standard, creating an adapter or converter, or “cloning” the interface of an
existing product. Cloning is explored as an extension to the model in §6.
3.2 Value Creation and Value Capture
Systems grow through the creation of new product categories and the development of new
products. The former is modeled as a stochastic arrival process which represents innovation
that lies beyond the immediate control of the firms. The latter is a strategic choice taken by
one firm at a time in a finite sequence of discrete periods. Together, these processes create
economic value that is captured by the firms and their customers.
Three things happen in each period. First, the arrival process is sampled, which may
result in the creation of one or more product categories. Second, a potential new entrant
arrives and makes a product development decision. Third, every active firm (including the
new entrant, if it chose to enter) receives a numerical payoff that depends on the new structure
of the system. The payoff represents the revenue derived from product sales during the period,
as determined by product market competition among the firms. The two types of dependence
give rise to two variations of the model, labeledGeneric and Specialized, which are defined
below. Both variations generate tree-structured architectures in which any product can serve
as a platform for applications, which in turn can be platforms at a higher architectural layer.
The Generic Model
In the first variation, product platforms are generic with respect to applications. This means
that platform owners are unable to extract economic rents from their complementors; their
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only source of profit is their direct customer base. When there is more than one product in
a given product category, customers enjoy a choice among compatible alternatives.
Let Ct denote the set of product categories and Pt denote the set of products in the
system at time t. (Sets and set-valued functions are indicated in bold type.) Let both be
empty at time zero. Let the function ct : Pt → Ct map each product to its category, and
subt(i) =
{
i′ ∈ Pt : ct(i′) = ct(i)} give the set of substitutes for each product. A category is
functional if it contains at least one product. In each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}:
Innovation A Poisson process with innovation rate λ is sampled to determine the number
of categories created, if any. Each new category is either a root category with no
dependencies or one that depends on a parent category in Ct−1, with all possibilities
that yield functional categories equally likely. Each new category j is assigned a use
value, vj , drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval.
Development A new firm arrives and decides whether to enter the market by developing
a new product. If so, it chooses a category in Ct in which to locate the product, and
incurs a one-time development cost κ. Otherwise, it incurs no cost. A firm that enters
the market is called an active firm.
Competition All active firms receive a payoff computed by dividing the use value of their
products’ categories by the number of substitutes in each category. That is, the owner
of product i receives piti = vj/
∣∣subt(i)∣∣, where j = ct(i). Inactive firms (those that
elected to stay out of the market) receive no payoff.
Dividing use values symmetrically among substitutes is consistent with the assumption that
products are horizontally differentiated within a category (each user has a favorite, even
though the products are functionally equivalent) and firms are able to extract buyers’ full
willingness to pay through perfect price discrimination. These are idealized assumptions, but
they relieve the need to explicitly model consumer preferences or price competition. While
a full demand system and pricing game could certainly be used instead, I argue in §5.2 that
doing so would only strengthen the main results.
The Specialized Model
The second variation follows the basic pattern of the Generic model, but stipulates that
products within a dependent category make use of information that is specific to a particular
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product platform rather than generic to a product category. This gives rise to the possi-
bility that platform owners can capture value from their dependent complementors through
architectural control.
Let pt : Ct → Pt map categories to their parent products, with pt(j) = ∅ if j is
a root category. Let part(i) = pt(ct(i)) denote the parent of product i, and let dept(i) ={
i′ ∈ Pt : part(i′) = i} denote the set of products that depend on i. Then:
Innovation When a new category arrives, either it is a root or it depends on a parent product
in Pt−1, again with all possibilities equally likely. The use value of a new category is
drawn randomly, as in the Generic model.
Development If it decides to engage in product development, an arriving firm i chooses,
in addition to a product category, a tax rate τi ∈ [0, 1] to apply to future dependent
products. The development cost, κ, is the same.
Competition Payoffs are now computed in two stages:
• Each firm collects use revenue uti by splitting its category’s use value with its
substitutes, as before.
• Each firm then collects tax revenue from the owners of dependent products. The
tax revenue for firm i is given by the recursive formula
wti =
∑
d∈dept(i)
τi
(
utd + wtd
)
which evaluates to zero for products without dependents. Firm i’s payoff is the
sum of its two revenue sources, reduced by the tax rate of its parent:
piti = (1− τp)
(
uti + wti
)
where p = part(i) and τ∅ = 0.
The tax rate represents the extent to which a firm chooses to leverage its position of ar-
chitectural control to extract value from its dependents. It is effectively a price charged to
dependent complementors, expressed as a fraction of their total revenue. A rate of zero for
all firms is equivalent to the Generic model. A rate of one means all revenue that would
have been captured by an application is transferred to its platform owner instead.
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Just as firms in an unregulated market are free to charge their customers whatever
the market will bear, platform owners in the model are free to demand any fraction of their
applications’ revenue, and potential complementors are free to build on other platforms or
stay out of the market. The important assumption is that a platform owner can exclude others
from creating compatible applications. This condition is met whenever compatibility requires
the use of information that is proprietary to the platform owner, such as an application
programming interface or communication protocol.
3.3 Firm Behavior and Learning
Having defined the basic rules of each model variation, we now need to specify how decisions
are made by potential entrants. Firms seek to maximize the present value, net of development
costs, of the payoff stream arising from their products. They apply a fixed discount rate
δ ∈ [0, 1] to this stream, representing the risk-adjusted cost of capital faced by firms in the
industry. Firms are fully informed about the architecture of the system, the decisions of prior
entrants, and the payoffs received. While they cannot directly reason about the behavior of
subsequent entrants, whose decisions may affect their own payoffs, they can use information
from the past to form expectations about the future.
Learning and Prediction
Historical information is recorded as a matrix of observed product characteristics, X, and a
vector of cumulative discounted net profits, Y . Both are maintained by a neutral observer
(analogous to an industry analyst), so all firms have the same information. Upon arrival at
time t, each firm is supplied with the industry’s history as of the end of the previous period,
denoted Xt−1 and Yt−1. (X0 and Y0 are initialized to zero vectors of the appropriate length.)
The columns of X differ for each variation of the model, as described below.
Each arriving firm selects a set of actions, A, to evaluate. Each action j ∈ A describes
a potential new product defined by a feature vector xj , where a zero vector denotes staying
out of the market. The elements of xj are either characteristics of the potential product’s
location (e.g., the use value of its category) or decision variables under the firm’s control
(e.g., the tax rate). X is constructed by stacking the feature vectors horizontally, creating
one row for each product in the market.
To evaluate its actions, the firm computes a vector of coefficients using ordinary
least-squares regression: βt =
(
X ′t−1Xt−1
)−1
X ′t−1Yt−1. In the early periods of an industry’s
evolution, βt will be undefined because X is not of full column rank. In this case, the firm
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selects among its alternatives with equal probability. Otherwise, for each action it computes
the linear combination yj = x′jβt, which yields a prediction of the net present value (NPV)
of the payoff stream for the product.
If βt is defined, the firm selects among its alternatives using a softmax selection rule,
also known as Boltzmann exploration, which is similar to the acceptance function typically
used in simulated annealing (Sutton and Barto 1998, pp. 30–31). Action j is chosen with
probability
p(j) = e
yj/ξt∑
k∈A eyk/ξt
where ξt ∈ R+ is a temperature parameter that is gradually lowered over time. In this scheme,
actions with higher predicted values are always chosen with higher probability than lower-
valued ones, but initially (when ξt is high) even actions that are predicted to be inferior may
be chosen with substantial likelihood. This mimics the tendency for firms in the early stages
of an industry’s evolution to explore a wide range of alternative strategies, while later firms
tend to converge toward a common view of their competitive situation.
Let j∗ be the chosen action, resulting in the creation of product i. The observer then
appends the row vector x′j∗ to Xt−1, yielding Xt. After payoffs are received, the observer
generates a profit vector, Yt, containing the time-discounted payoff for each active firm:
yti = yt−1i + piti/ (1 + δ)
t−ti
where yti is the ith element of Yt, and ti is the period in which firm i’s product was created. In
the period of a product’s creation, its development cost is also subtracted from the recorded
payoff.
Action Selection
The firms are faced with progressively more complex decision problems in each model varia-
tion. In each variation, however, decisions are made by evaluating a limited set of possible
actions, A, and selecting the one predicted to yield the highest NPV. In the Generic varia-
tion of the model, a firm evaluates up to A locations (product categories) in which to develop
a product. The locations are drawn uniformly at random from the set of functional cate-
gories. In addition, a null action—choosing not to enter the market—is always available.
In the Specialized variation, a firm chooses a tax rate in addition to a product location.
For each of the A categories selected for evaluation as above, the firm draws Aτ tax rates
uniformly at random, evaluating a total of A ·Aτ actions per firm.
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Feature Description 
G
E
N
E
R
IC 
S
P
E
C
IA
L
IZ
E
D
 
ACTIVE Indicator variable: 1 if entering the market, 0 otherwise X X 
LAYER Architectural depth of the product category; 1 for a root category X X 
ENTRANT 
Number of competitors that will occupy the product’s category after 
product development; 1 for a currently unoccupied category 
X X 
USEVALUE Use value of the prospective product category X X 
PARENTTAX Tax rate of the prospective product’s parent platform  X 
TAX, TAX^2 Tax rate chosen by the firm, and the chosen tax rate squared  X 
LEVEL ⋅ TAX, 
LEVEL ⋅ TAX^2 Interaction terms between LEVEL and TAX, LEVEL and TAX^2  X 
 
Table 1: Feature vector elements by type of dependence.
Note that firms do not need to be particularly smart about selecting actions to con-
sider, as long as they generate enough “raw material” from which the forecasting algorithm
can select. This is an instance of the principle of selective variety, attributed to Ashby
(1952). I also experimented with allowing firms to use the regression coefficients to estimate
an optimal tax for each position directly. This approach yielded slightly higher performance
and faster learning, at the cost of being significantly more complicated to explain. Since the
overall results were qualitatively similar, only the random approach is presented in the paper.
Feature Definitions
With more degrees of freedom, firms need to consider more features of their environment to
make effective decisions. Table 1 defines the variables that are computed for each prospective
action j ∈ A to construct the feature vector xj . For the null action, all features are set to
zero. Section 7.1 discusses the selection of these features and the robustness of the results to
alternative feature definitions.
Industry Experience
At the beginning of an industry’s history, the annealing temperature is high and βt may be
undefined. Therefore, firms that arrive early will behave almost or entirely at random. In real
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life, however, managers often reason by analogy from their own experience, even when the
collective folk wisdom of the industry is an unreliable guide (Gavetti et al. 2005). Allowing
firms to accumulate experience “oﬄine” (i.e., before making actual product development
decisions) is thus important both for the realism of the model and, not surprisingly, for the
robustness of the results.
To implement this idea, an additional parameter called Experience is used to de-
termine the amount of learning that firms do before the birth of their industry. Experience is
measured in generations; each generation is a set of T periods in the life of a similar industry
whose evolution is observed by subsequent generations. As a loose analogy, consider the situ-
ation of personal computer manufacturers in the 1980s (see, e.g., Bresnahan and Greenstein
1999). Managers at these firms had observed the development of two prior generations of
computers, mainframes and minicomputers, and could apply lessons from this experience to
their own industry segment.
Industry-level learning is implemented by adding two simple details to the model.
First, the system architecture is initialized at the beginning of each generation (i.e., firms
are given a “clean slate” to explore a new design space), although the industry’s “clock,”
t, continues to be incremented and the observer agent’s “memory,” stored in X and Y , is
preserved. Second, the annealing schedule is extended to account for the entire sequence of
generations, allowing firms in later generations to exploit the experience of their predecessors.
Only the last generation of each industry is reported in the experimental results.
3.4 Experimental Design
I implemented the model in the Java programming language and conducted a set of compu-
tational experiments.2 The main experiments and their parameters are summarized in Table
2. Experiment 1 studied firm-level outcomes for the Generic and Specialized models, as
well as a third model variation (Clonable) described in §6. Experiment 2 focused on the
relationship between industry attractiveness and industry profit. Experiment 3 focused on
the effects of the tax rate, which was fixed for all firms in an industry but varied across trials.
Each experiment consisted of a series of trials. The length of each trial, T , was 150
periods. Taking each period to represent a fiscal quarter, this corresponds to roughly 35–40
years of “real time” in the life of an industry. The action selection parameters, A and Aτ ,
were set to 10 and 5 respectively. The initial annealing temperature, ξ0, was set to 1.0 and
2The code was developed using a hybrid of the MASON (Luke et al. 2004) and Repast (North et al. 2006)
simulation frameworks, and is available on request. The experiments were carried out on a cluster of Linux
servers over several days.
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Experiment Model TAXATION EXPERIENCE INDATTRACT Trials 
(a) GENERIC None 1 generation 
(b) SPECIALIZED Endogenous 2 generations 1 
(c) CLONABLE Endogenous 3 generations 
Medium 
(i) 500 (period-
level obs.) 
 
(ii) 5,000 (firm-
level obs.) 
2 GENERIC None 1 generation 
Low, Medium, 
High 
10,000 per 
industry type 
3 SPECIALIZED 
Fixed 
(0, .125, ... , 1) 
2 generations Medium 
2,500 per 
tax rate 
 
Table 2: Computational simulation experiments and parameters.
decayed exponentially to reach 0.1 at the end of each trial.
The Taxation parameter indicates the way tax rates were determined in each ex-
periment. In the Generic model, firms cannot extract rents from their complementors, so
there is no taxation in Experiments 1a and 2. In Experiments 1b and 1c, each firm chose
a tax rate according to the decision rule described in §3.3. In Experiment 3, all firms in a
given industry were constrained to choose the same tax, which was varied across trials from
0 to 1 in increments of eighths.
The Experience parameter, as defined above, indicates the number of prior industry
generations observed by the focal firms in each trial. More generations are needed for effective
learning as the firms’ decision problem becomes more difficult, but too many can cause firms
to overfit the historical data they observe. The actual parameter values were chosen based
on preliminary experiments; the main results are qualitatively robust to values from 1 to 4.
The IndAttract parameter was defined as a composite of three drivers of industry
attractiveness: the innovation rate (λ), the product development cost (κ), and the discount
rate applied to future payoffs (δ). Preliminary experiments showed that each of these influ-
ences firm behavior in a similar way: more rapid innovation, lower development costs, and
lower costs of capital encourage entry by driving expected payoffs up, and vice versa.3 To
reduce the complexity of the experiments, I combined the three as follows:
3There were also some subtle differences and interactions. At high innovation rates, for example, firm
performance became constrained by the number of potential product locations each firm could evaluate,
increasing the sensitivity of the results to A. High development costs strongly deterred entry unless the
discount rate was sufficiently low, and vice versa. None of these effects is a source of significant insight into
the phenomena at hand, however, so I “tuned” the industry parameters to avoid them.
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IndAttract λ κ δ
Low 0.2 5.0 0.05
Medium 0.5 3.0 0.03
High 1.0 1.0 0.01
Note that under the interpretation of a period as a quarter, the discount rate for the case
of medium industry attractiveness, δ = 0.03, yields about a 13% annual cost of capital—a
reasonable hurdle rate for new product development projects in the real world.
The last column of Table 2 indicates the number of independent trials that were
performed for each parameter combination. Each trial was conducted using a unique random
seed to reduce the possibility of simulation artifacts.
I collected data at three levels of granularity: industry, firm, and period. Firm- and
industry-level data was collected for all experiments. More detailed data on the firms active
in each period was collected for Experiment 1 using an additional run for each of the three
sub-experiments, with fewer trials to keep the volume of data manageable. At the industry
level, all choice and outcome variables were averaged across firms and cumulated over time,
resulting in a single observation at the end of each trial. At the firm level, choices and
outcomes were recorded for each firm (up to T observations per trial). At the period level, a
record was made of each firm’s choices at entry and its payoff in each subsequent period (up
to T (T + 1)/2 observations per trial). The observed variables are defined in Table 3.
4 Results: Firms and Products
The experiments were designed to address the two basic questions posed at the outset of
the paper: What conditions lead to vibrant and profitable platform industries, and how
can firms successfully compete in them? Careful examination also reveals the whys—the
causal mechanisms that determine firm and industry performance in the model. Even where
these findings are consistent with results from network economics and technology strategy,
they sharpen our intuition about the forces that shape the incentives of competitors and
complementors in platform industries.
This section presents the main results of Experiment 1, focusing on the firm as the unit
of analysis. In the Generic case, our simulated firms discover and exploit attractive oppor-
tunities, tending to equalize expected returns across product categories. In the Specialized
case, value extracted from dependents is protected from competition, making platforms a
sustainable source of superior returns. Application developers face a more challenging envi-
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Variable Description 
Industry 
F
irm
 
P
eriod 
INDENTRANTS Total number of entrant firms in the industry X X X 
INDPROFIT Total (non-discounted) industry profit X X X 
AVGNPV Mean discounted profit per firm X X X 
AVGDEPTH Mean architectural depth of products X X X 
AVGWIDTH Mean number of substitute products per category X X X 
SYSVALUE Total value of products after the final period X X X 
DEBUT Period in which the focal firm entered with a new product  X X 
LAYER, 
ENTRANT, 
USEVALUE, 
PARENTTAX, 
TAX 
The feature variables of the same names (see Table 1), recorded on 
entry by the focal firm 
 X X 
NPV The focal firm’s total discounted profit  X  
PAYOFF Each firm’s (non-discounted) payoff during the period   X 
 
Table 3: Data collected at the industry, firm, and period level of granularity.
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Figure 2: Average per-period revenue by type of dependence and product position.
ronment. They survive, and even thrive, by choosing categories with above-average use values
and below-average taxes. Their choices, in turn, deter platform owners from exercising their
full market power.
4.1 Platform Owners Earn Sustained Superior Returns,
But Application Developers Do Surprisingly Well
Figure 2 plots the average per-period firm revenue as a function of time and architectural
position, using the period-level data from Experiments 1a and 1b. Position is indexed by the
architectural layer of the firm’s product and the firm’s sequence of entry within its product
category. Time, on the horizontal axis, is measured relative to the period in which the firm
entered the market. The upper leftmost point in the top left panel thus represents the average
payoff, excluding development cost, for the first entrant in a root-layer product category in
the period of its debut.
The top three panels reveal that firms in the Generic model enjoy a brief period of
high revenues that are soon dissipated by competition. In contrast, revenues in the Special-
ized case tend to increase as platform owners capture value from their dependents through
architectural control. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms in layer 1 (i.e., the
root layer): those that supply basic components, like computer operating systems, on which
many others depend. We would expect, and indeed find on closer examination, that the
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Figure 3: Average profit per entering firm by type of dependence and product position.
upward trend in the Specialized case is due to economic rents (“taxes”) collected from
dependent complementors, which increase as application developers build on a platform and
those applications, in turn, become platforms for others.
So where in these evolving systems should firms choose to develop their products?
Figure 3 provides an answer obtained by collapsing the time axis of the previous figure and
plotting the average firm profit, discounted back to the period of market entry, for each ar-
chitectural position. One pattern is simple and consistent: on average, it is better to enter
a product category earlier than later. This is true in both the Generic and Specialized
models, since firms in both cases are subject to competition with products in the same cate-
gory (economic substitutes). As a result of their learning behavior, firms spread themselves
out to exploit locations in the architecture where competition is less intense. The supply
of such locations increases through innovation, which dynamically gives rise to new product
categories.
The relationship between architectural layer and profit is initially more puzzling. In
the Generic case, profit increases slightly by layer for the first entrant in each category. In
the Specialized case, the relationship is convex. Firms that create root-layer platforms do
better than those in the second layer, as we would expect from their privileged positions in
the architecture. But firms that develop applications in higher layers do not do substantially
worse than second-layer firms, and often do better. To explain this pattern, we need to
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Figure 4: Average product use value by type of dependence and product position.
break down the firms’ revenue into its two components: use value derived from horizontal
competition within each product category, and taxes that flow vertically across layers.
4.2 Application Developers Learn to Exploit Niche Markets
Figure 4 begins to shed light on the surprisingly strong performance of firms at higher layers
of the system architecture. The figure plots, for the Generic and Specialized cases, the
average use value of products by their architectural positions. Within categories in the same
layer, products developed later have higher use values, on average, than those developed
earlier. (Recall that category use values are distributed uniformly at random, so this implies
that firms are not randomly selecting categories to develop.) In the Generic case use values
also increase monotonically across layers. In the Specialized case there is a sharp rise
between the first layer and subsequent ones, but earlier entrants at higher layers end up in
slightly less valuable categories than either entrants in lower layers or later entrants in the
same layer—another puzzle.
The explanation for these relationships is simple but subtle. The simple intuition is
that as an industry matures, growing both architecturally deeper and more densely populated,
firms get more selective about where to develop products. The subtlety is that two distinct
forces play a role in the selection process:
• First, the supply of categories is jointly determined by prior innovation and product
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development. While new categories arrive at a fixed rate (λ), the locations available for
them to attach to the system architecture are determined by the location of existing
platforms—that is, prior entrants’ products. If the prior entrants have been active in
building on each other’s products, categories will be distributed over many layers of the
architecture. (Systems with 8–10 layers arose frequently in the experiments.) On the
other hand, if new entrants tend to crowd into categories near the root layer, there will
be few categories at higher layers.
• Second, the demand for categories is determined by their attractiveness to entrants—
in other words, categories compete for new products. A category that is crowded or
at a high layer must typically offer a higher use value or lower parent tax than the
alternatives, to compensate a potential entrant for the lower profit it would otherwise
expect to earn in that category. If no category offers the expectation of recouping the
entrant’s development cost, the entrant may choose to stay out of the market.
Both forces are evident in Figure 4. In the Specialized model, the fact that the supply of
categories is biased toward lower layers by prior entrants’ decisions results in fewer categories
at layers 4 and 5 than layer 3, pulling down the average use value in those positions. No such
bias exists in the Generic model, which accounts for the steady increase in use value in that
case. (This contrast, which is due to the presence of architectural control in the Specialized
model, will be explored further in §5.2.) In both cases, later entrants demand high use values
to justify investing in a crowded category.
Intuitively, we are observing the emergence of differentiated strategies. Root-layer
firms in the Specialized model can afford to develop products in categories with average or
even below-average use value because the bulk of their revenue will come from their dependent
complementors. But later entrants who choose to locate deeper in the architecture must be
more selective, since they have to pay a substantial fraction of their revenue “down the stack”
to the platforms they build on, and cannot expect many others to build on them.
4.3 Selection Pressure Limits the Power of Platform Owners
Figure 5 reveals a second mechanism by which the additional choices available to firms in
higher layers of the architecture can mitigate the cost of architectural dependence in the
Specialized case. The right-hand panel shows the average parent tax (the fraction of a
product’s revenue that is transferred to the owner of its parent platform), again broken out
by position. Recall that while the tax rate is defined narrowly as a price of dependence
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extracted through architectural control, it is intended to encompass any policy that affects
the share of value that a platform captures from its dependent complementors.
As with use value, firms enjoy more favorable outcomes in higher layers and more
crowded categories. The twist in this case is that parent taxes are not determined exogenously,
like use values, but are chosen by platform owners. The left-hand panel of the figure shows
the average tax rates chosen. Why do they slope downward? Because firms learn that they
must choose lower taxes at higher layers to maximize their profits. Where does this pressure
come from? Their application developers—the firms to the right in the graph. By selecting
platforms with favorable tax rates, these firms create incentives to keep taxes low.4 As a
result, the average tax paid by firms in each layer is uniformly lower than the rate chosen by
the firms in the parent layer. In other words, the power of platform owners is limited by the
forces of selection that are unleashed in deeper system architectures.
5 Results: Industries and Systems
We now step back to consider factors that affect the structure and performance of platform
industries. Our first task is to explore the drivers of industry attractiveness: innovation
4If application developers did not favor platforms with lower tax rates, platform owners would simply
charge what the market would bear, namely a tax rate close to one. This was observed in supplementary
experiments in which agents did not observe the ParentTax feature; see §7.1.
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rate, product development cost, and cost of capital—all of which were held constant in the
firm-level analysis. We then turn to the effects of platform owners’ policies toward their
complementors, which in turn are closely related to industry performance.
5.1 Favorable Industry Conditions Attract Entry
Recall that more attractive industries, as defined by the IndAttract parameter, offer firms
the possibility of earning higher profits, on average, than less attractive ones. If firms are
effective at assessing their situations and responding appropriately, industries with more
favorable conditions should attract more entrants than less favorable ones, and these firms
should earn higher profits. Preliminary experiments confirmed this to be true in both the
Generic and Specialized models. The result is most clearly seen in the Generic case
(Experiment 2), as shown in Figure 6.
The figure shows the distribution of total industry profit as a function of industry
attractiveness. As expected, more attractive industries tend to yield higher profits. Within
each industry type, profits appear normally distributed. Two factors could account for the
variation in profit among industries with the same costs and rate of innovation: differing paths
of industry evolution across trials (due, for example, to the fact that innovation is governed
by a stochastic arrival process), and random variation in firms’ effectiveness at realizing the
profit potential of each industry.
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The sharpness of the vertical spike at zero suggests that the former explanation dom-
inates the latter. Nothing in the model prevents industries from losing money; all firms could
enter and fail to recoup their development costs, resulting in a negative industry profit. But
this only happened in three out of the 10,000 trials in Experiment 2. Far more frequently,
firms in low-type industries correctly decided to stay out of the market rather than incur
losses. This evidence suggests that firms do respond effectively to their environment, such
that more favorable conditions attract market entry.5 While hardly counterintuitive, this
result helps build confidence that the boundedly rational agents in the model behave in ways
that resemble real-world firms.
5.2 Firm Strategy Influences System Architecture;
System Architecture Mediates Industry Performance
For all of the results presented up to this point, firms in the Specialized model have chosen
tax rates based on the decision rule given in §3.3. While the endogeneity of architectural con-
trol is an attractive feature of the model, it is also useful to break this causal feedback loop to
better understand the relationship between firms’ strategic decisions and industry outcomes.
Experiment 3 achieves this by fixing the tax rate for all firms in a set of experimental trials.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between these fixed tax rates and two key properties of the
system architecture: the average architectural “depth” (in layers) of products in the system,
and the average “width” of product categories (measured as the average number of substitutes
faced by each product). For reference, the figure also shows the average depth and width for
the Generic model (in which there are no dependency taxes), and the Specialized model
with endogenous taxes.6
The left-hand panel shows the average system depth as a function of the tax rate. It
declines from 3.09 to 1.03 as taxes are increased from zero to one. This means that while
firms with low tax rates readily build on each other’s products to create rich tree-structured
systems (typically 5–6 levels deep), firms with high tax rates hardly ever build on each
other’s products at all. (In the extreme case of τ = 1, to do so is always a mistake since the
5The spike at zero might simply indicate that the firms were overly pessimistic in their expectations.
Systematically pessimistic agents, however, would “leave money on the table,” resulting in a gap or depression
in the profit distribution to the right of zero. Looking closely at the graph, a flat area in the low-type plot is
indeed visible—perhaps an artifact of risk aversion inadvertently introduced into the model—but it represents
a small fraction of the total range of industry profit.
6As one would expect, the Generic case resembles the case in which taxes are fixed at zero. Interestingly,
firms build deeper systems when taxes are endogenous than when they are fixed at the average endogenous
tax rate (about 0.54), and also populate product categories more densely. Tax-setting firms also turn out to
be more profitable than their fixed-tax counterparts, as shown in Figure 8. This further illustrates the ability
of the firms in the model to adapt successfully to their environment when given the flexibility to do so.
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Figure 7: Average system depth and width for the Specialized model with fixed tax rates.
Reference lines show average depth and width for the Generic model and the Specialized
model with endogenous tax rates.
dependent firm never obtains any revenue.) More generally, while it may occasionally benefit
a firm to develop a product that builds on many others (e.g., in a high-value category that
has yet to be exploited by other firms), firms in high-tax environments tend to be motivated
to confine their products to categories near the root layer, the number of which is limited by
the innovation rate (λ).
The right-hand panel, which plots the average system width as a function of the tax
rate, shows the dramatic consequences of the firms’ aversion to costly dependence. The higher
the tax, the more firms crowd into the roots. Because we assume that firms capture all the
value created by a system, this crowding has no direct effect on industry profit. (This is a
conservative assumption. If we made the more natural assumption that consumers capture
more value as a category becomes more competitive, then higher taxes would be even worse
for profits.) But categories that are left vacant contribute no value to the system, so we
would expect the absence of complementors to reduce the total value—the proverbial pie—
over which the firms compete. The result should be a less profitable industry structure that
supports fewer entrants.
Figure 8 confirms that this is indeed the case. The main plot in each panel shows the
average number of entrant firms and industry profit, respectively, for trials of the Specialized
model in which the tax rate was fixed as in the previous figure. We now see that the exercise of
architectural control by platform owners has an unambiguously negative impact on industry
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Figure 8: Average industry performance (number of entrants and total industry profit) for
the Specialized model with fixed tax rates, with reference lines as in Figure 7.
performance. Conversely, “open systems” (narrowly defined as those in which application
developers can build on platforms at low cost) yield deeper architectures and more profitable
industries overall.
The notion of a tax that is fixed for all firms is admittedly artificial. While certain
policy choices might have effects analogous to a global change in tax rate (e.g., mandating
nondiscriminatory licensing of proprietary interfaces and protocols), the fixed-tax case is
primarily a device to help isolate the forces at work in the model. Once again, these forces
are simple but more subtle than they might appear at first glance. Firms’ decisions about how
to treat their complementors (i.e., their tax rates) affect the incentives facing future entrants,
and consequently the ratio of complements to substitutes in the system. Systems with more
deeply nested trees—in other words, more occupied niches—have a greater capacity to sustain
profitable product development.
6 Extension: Cloning of Incumbent Platforms
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, I initially modeled architectural control as an all-or-
nothing proposition. In the Generic case, all applications are compatible with all platforms,
and no platform owner can capture value from its applications. In the Specialized case, the
opposite is true: applications are restricted to a single platform, and platform owners enjoy
the ability to capture an arbitrary fraction of their applications’ value due to what amounts
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to perfect and perpetual (though voluntary) lock-in.
In reality, architectural control is often undermined by one’s rivals, who commonly
invest in lowering the switching costs for developers to move to a competing platform. This
section extends the Specialized model by allowing entering firms to clone an existing prod-
uct instead of creating a regular substitute. Cloning replicates the interface exposed by
the original product, thereby achieving compatibility with existing and future applications.
Experimental results obtained with this new model variation, labeled Clonable, show that
cloning gives rise to commoditization, which weakens the ability of root-layer platform owners
to capture the lion’s share of value in the system. In addition, we observe value migration:
profit moves “up the stack” into deeper layers of the architecture. Both of these forces have
been historically important in digital system industries, and warrant further investigation.
6.1 The Clonable Model
Figure 9 illustrates how the Clonable model works. Suppose there are initially two compo-
nents, a platform (the IBM PC) and an application (Microsoft’s DOS operating system). A
new entrant (Compaq) decides to create an IBM PC clone that will run DOS as well as new
applications (eventually including Windows). The entrant incurs an additional cost to make
its product interact with third-party software exactly like the IBM PC, without violating
IBM’s intellectual property rights. The result is a new product (the Compaq Portable) that
shares a common interface with the original, denoted in the figure by a dotted line. This in-
terface allows Compaq to “pry loose” the dependency arrow that represented the specialized
dependence of DOS on the IBM PC, while leaving enough flexibility for distinct competing
implementations. (For example, while the Compaq Portable resembled the PC from a soft-
ware developer’s perspective, its physical form factor was very different, allowing Compaq to
serve a different target market rather than competing head-to-head with IBM.)
Formally, cloning is modeled by defining a set of developer interfaces, Dt, and as-
sociating each product with an interface using a function dt : Pt → Dt. Let clot(i) ={
i′ ∈ Pt : dt(i′) = dt(i)} denote the set of clones for each product. Let pt : Ct → Dt now map
each category to its parent interface (rather than its category as in the Specialized model),
with pt(j) = ∅ if j is a root category. Similarly, let dept(i) =
{
i′ ∈ Pt : part(i′) = dt(i)} now
denote the set of products that depend on i’s interface (rather than i itself). Then:
Innovation Similar to the original model variations, a new category is either a root or
attached by a dependency to a parent interface in Dt−1, with all possibilities equally
likely. All products are taken to have interfaces, even those that have not been cloned.
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Figure 9: Clonable dependence, which preserves compatibility with existing products.
Development An arriving firm now faces a third decision variable: to clone or not to clone.
If not, the firm creates a regular substitute instead of a clone, choosing a product
category and tax rate as in the Specialized case. If so, it chooses a particular product
as a target. Two special rules then apply:
• If the target product has never been cloned, the entrant incurs a cost of κ + κˆ,
where κˆ is the cost of replicating the target’s interface. If the target has already
been cloned, the entrant pays κ− κˆ.
• Instead of choosing a tax arbitrarily, the entrant sets a tax calculated to undercut
its rivals by a fixed fraction γ ∈ [0, 1]. Let τ t(i) = mink∈clot(i) τk be the lowest tax
rate among the clones of product i. A new clone i′ with target i arriving in period
t sets a tax of τi′ = (1− γ)τ t−1(i).
Competition Call τ t(i) the effective tax rate of product i ∈ Pt, and let τ t(j) denote the
common effective tax rate among products implementing j ∈ Dt. Dependent firms are
taxed at the effective rate of their parent interface, and tax revenues are divided evenly
among clones:
wti =
∑
d∈dept(i)
τ t(i)∣∣clot(i)∣∣
(
utd + wtd
)
piti =
[
1− τ t(p)
] (
uti + wti
)
where p = part(i) and τ t(∅) = 0.
The assumption of a common effective tax rate across clones implies that application devel-
opers are indifferent among products that implement the same interface. Since we assume
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that all clones are equally compatible with applications written for the original platform, it
is natural to suppose that no firm can extract a higher tax than the maker of any clone.
The assumption that development costs are lower for the second and subsequent
clones is motivated by the observation that both the original interface design and the first
clone are fixed costs that need not be borne by later cloners if the design becomes widely
available through licensing or standardization. In the case of the IBM PC, while the first
clone of the IBM BIOS was costly and legally risky to create, it spawned a legion of followers
who realized lower costs than either IBM or Compaq by licensing BIOS implementations
from niche players such as Phoenix and Award.
The learning algorithm remains unchanged for the Clonable model, except that
three new features are observed by potential entrants:
• FirstClone, SubClone: Indicator variables that are 1 if the action calls for creating
a first or subsequent clone, respectively, or 0 otherwise.
• FirstClone · DepValue: If the action calls for creating the first clone, the total use
value of categories that directly depend on the target product, or 0 otherwise.
To generate the action set, a firm selects up to A products to consider as cloning targets
(with the tax rate set according to the fixed discount rule described above), in addition to
the A ·Aτ location–tax combinations selected in the Specialized model.
TheClonablemodel was implemented in Java along with the other model variations,
and simulated as Experiment 1c. In this experiment, κˆ was set to 1.0 and γ to 0.2.
6.2 Value Migration Shifts Profit into New Layers
As in the Specialized model, firms in the Clonable model can extract rents through archi-
tectural control. But this control is undermined by entrants’ ability to maintain compatibility
with existing complementors when substituting into a product category. The result is a sharp
reduction in the advantage enjoyed by early entrants, almost to the level of the Generic
model. Figure 10 provides two views of this effect.
In addition to the generally lower revenue levels, the figure shows a substantial shift
of value from the first architectural layer to deeper ones. Tax revenue continues to increase
over time in the first layer, as in the Specialized case, but at a lower rate. Second- and
third-layer firms, however, enjoy a long period of high returns. By exposing platforms to
commoditization, cloning shifts profit deeper into the system architecture. This pattern
is consistent with what Slywotzky (1996) labeled value migration: a shift from outmoded
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Figure 10: Average revenue per period (left) and net profit (right) for the Clonable model.
business designs toward new designs that create more value for customers and allow firms to
capture more of this value as profit. Although I model product and system designs rather
than business designs per se, the results show that the possibility of cloning tends to weaken
the strategy of being first to market with a new platform product, while increasing the
attractiveness of creating an application product in a well-chosen niche.
6.3 Cloning Undermines the Power of Architectural Control
Figure 11 puts all three model variations into perspective and provides another illustration of
the way cloning undermines the power of architectural control. For each variation, the figure
shows the complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of firm profits plotted on
log-log axes. This kind of graph is standard in the study of power-law statistics (Mitzen-
macher 2004). Moving rightward along the horizontal axis, the graph shows the rate at which
the probability of unusually high profit decreases for each type of dependence.
In the Specialized and Clonable cases, the figure displays the “fat tails” charac-
teristic of processes in which early advantages are reinforced over time. The signature of this
effect is the near-linearity of both ccdf plots (see Barabási and Bonabeau 2003, though note
that only the firms’ profits exhibit power-law behavior here, not the number of dependencies
they attract). Intuitively, “the rich get richer” in both models—but less rich and less often
when cloning is possible. In the Specialized case, the maximum net profit is close to 60,
while in the Clonable case it is under 30 and the steeper slope indicates a lighter tail. In
the Generic case, by contrast, the tail of the distribution falls off steeply to a maximum
profit of about 20.
30
!8
!4
0
log
(F
re
qu
en
cy
)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Net discounted profit
Generic Specialized ClonableDependence
Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c
by Type of Dependence
Cumulative Distribution of Profit per Firm
Figure 11: Cumulative distribution of firm profit by type of dependence.
7 Discussion
Even with the Clonable extension, the model is missing a long list of desirable features. In
particular, the fact that firms are limited to a single product development decision severely
limits our ability to study the fascinating range of moves and countermoves that firms employ
in their ongoing struggle for competitive advantage. However, we have achieved the more
modest goal of exploring strategic behavior in an evolving system architecture using agents
that learn from the past and form expectations about the future.
Before concluding, this section briefly discusses three further questions: How robust
are the results to variations in the model structure, especially to the learning algorithm? How
well do the firms perform compared to an appropriate benchmark of economic efficiency? And
what additional modeling assumptions might shed more light on value migration?
7.1 Robustness and Realism
Like many computational modeling techniques, the learning algorithm used in the model is
sensitive to the representation of the agents’ environment. Developing the list of predictive
features in §3.3 was an iterative process, and I experimented by giving the firms both more
and fewer generations of learning experience. Although these variations measurably affected
the results, the main findings of the experiments are qualitatively robust to them.
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Feature Engineering
In specifying the feature set observed by potential entrants, I faced two countervailing issues:
• On one hand, for the firms to respond to a particular economic force, they need to be
able to distinguish it from other forces. Consider tax rates as an example. Without
ParentTax as a feature, firms are insensitive to the tax rates of potential platforms. As
a result, firms learn that they can charge high taxes without deterring complementors
from building on their products, so average taxes go up. This is reflected in a strongly
negative coefficient on Layer. Rather than learning that building on high-tax platforms
is bad, firms learn that building on any platform is bad, and they crowd into the roots
of the design hierarchy. Since firms at the roots are unable to reverse this trend by
undercutting each other, the situation persists as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
• On the other hand, adding “irrelevant” features can make them relevant and further
distort the firms’ decisions. Consider adding a feature calledAvgTax that measures the
average tax rate in the system. Recall that a firm’s payoffs are nominally independent of
all taxes except those of its immediate parent and its dependents. But endowing firms
with the ability to draw inferences using this global statistic causes their expected
payoffs to become dependent, if indirectly, on the actions of all other firms. Moreover,
since firms in the model do not test regression coefficients for significance, self-fulfilling
prophecies can arise from path dependence or random noise.
These “feature engineering” issues are fundamental in multi-agent systems, and there are
sophisticated ways to deal with them. For example, Sutton and Barto (1998, pp. 200–213)
discuss techniques such as tile coding that can make feature definitions more robust. I took
a simpler heuristic approach. Starting with a large set of features, including several kinds of
interactions among the main variables, I progressively removed features until the main results
became distorted or negated. In several cases this yielded quantitatively weaker results, but
I judged this cost to be outweighed by the benefit of a model that is easier to understand.
Experience Effects
In the main experiments, the Experience parameter was fixed at a different value for each
model variation, as indicated in Table 2. This introduces the possibility that differences in
the results across variations are due to changes in Experience rather than differences in
the rules for each variation. To allay this concern, I performed an additional experiment
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that varied Experience from 0 to 4 generations for the Specialized case of the model. I
recorded the distribution of two variables: RSquared, the coefficient of determination for
the final entrant’s NPV regression; and SysValue, the total value of the industry’s products
in the final time period. RSquared measures the extent to which firms are able to correctly
predict their future profits as a function of their product location and tax choices.
I expected that higher values of Experience (i.e., more generations of learning)
would generally yield higher RSquared values, but that diminishing returns would set in as
the firms reached the limit of what they could learn about their complex and uncertain en-
vironment. In fact, as reported in Woodard (2006, ch. 4), I found the opposite: RSquared
appeared to converge to a minimum value as Experience increased. My tentative ex-
planation is that low values of Experience have a higher tendency to yield self-fulfilling
prophecies of the kind described above, which are reflected in high RSquared values. That
said, the overall distribution of SysValue was not significantly affected by the Experience
parameter, providing some evidence that the results are qualitatively robust to the amount
of learning in the model.
7.2 Efficiency and Equilibrium
As in traditional economic models, it is appropriate to ask how the firms’ collective perfor-
mance compares to a benchmark of optimality. In the model of this paper, industry profit
is maximized when each new product category is populated immediately by a single firm,
provided the discounted value of the firm’s revenue stream eventually exceeds its development
cost. In other words, the efficient industry structure entails monopoly in categories that are
high in value or arrive early, and vacancy from those that are low in value or arrive late.
It is easy to see that this yields both revenue maximization (since no profitable category is
unexploited) and cost minimization (since firms refrain from duplicate investments in pur-
suit of the same use value). However, the value of such configurations is not necessarily of
theoretical or practical interest. In particular, it is not a useful benchmark for social welfare
because the model lacks product prices and downward-sloping demand curves. If these were
included, we would expect to obtain the standard result that monopolists thwart welfare
efficiency by pricing their products too high and selling too few of them.
It is more interesting—and more difficult—to ask whether individual firms are doing
the best for themselves, given the behavior of the other firms. In other words, does their
behavior resemble an equilibrium of a noncooperative game? Computing such an equilibrium
directly is out of the question. Although firms make decisions sequentially, their discounted
33
payoffs depend on the actions of subsequent entrants. In absence of a dominant strategy, the
equilibrium behavior of a firm entering at time t0 would have to account for the expected
responses of all firms entering at t > t0. Since firms are boundedly rational, these expectations
would have to account for the firms’ cognitive limitations and the details of their learning
process. A more tractable approach would follow the lead of evolutionary game theory
(Weibull 1995; Samuelson 1997) and introduce “mutants” with deviant strategies, such as
always charging a tax of 1. I explored this possibility during preliminary experiments and
discovered that where firms were naive (with no prior industry experience), such mutants
were more likely to do well. As experience increased, the effect diminished.
7.3 Toward “Traveling Waves” of Commoditization
Although the Clonable model exhibited both commoditization and value migration, oppor-
tunities remain for a more thorough analysis of these phenomena using similar methods. In
his thoughtful analysis of Christensen and Raynor’s (2003) “law of conservation of attractive
profits,” David Stutz describes these phenomena in the computer software industry:
The migration of margin-rich opportunities is not always “up the value chain”
. . . . Instead, the value chain acts as a carrier for slowly traveling waves, on
which higher-margin business opportunities move both up and down. Examples
of this wave phenomenon abound: consider the current commoditization, intense
political activity, and shake-out that is occurring within the Java virtual machine
ecosystem. Implementations of the Java VM will lose much of their proprietary
value over time, but as they do, complex proprietary frameworks written in Java
are likely to appear above the level of the newly ubiquitous virtual machines,
while below them new hosts will also appear to bring Java code to entirely new
markets. Likewise, printer drivers were once commoditized by word processors,
Microsoft Office is currently being commoditized by OpenOffice, Internet Explorer
will eventually be commoditized by Mozilla, Opera, Safari, and other browsers,
and the Unix API has nearly been completely commoditized by Linux. New
platforms emerge above and below freshly commoditized layers, exploiting the
standardized interfaces and newly “free” infrastructure. (Stutz 2004)
While I would hesitate to characterize this phenomenon as a conservation law—on the con-
trary, I would assert that value migration often creates value on a massive scale—Stutz aptly
describes the key forces of design evolution in the software industry. I would note further
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that the main beneficiaries of cloning, both in the current version of the Clonable model
and in real life, are not usually the firms that produce the clones but rather their dependent
complementors. Consider the personal computer industry as a classic example: Microsoft
and Intel undoubtedly gained more from the cloning of the IBM PC BIOS than all the PC
clone makers combined.
In the Clonable model as it stands, an entrant must be able to justify the cloning
cost based solely on the fraction of tax revenue it expects to siphon off from the incumbent,
which it knows will decrease as additional cloners are drawn into the market. This tends
to limit cloning to platforms with high use value and a large “installed base” of locked-in
applications. In contrast, if complementors could (perhaps jointly) fund the cloning of their
parents, a much larger set of cloning opportunities would become economically attractive.
Indeed, it is no accident that Intel and Microsoft continue to invest in ensuring that their
adjacent architectural layers remain as commoditized, i.e., standardized, as possible (Gawer
and Cusumano 2002; Christensen and Raynor 2003).
8 Conclusion
This paper presented a computational agent-based model that explores the tension between
developers of platforms and applications in digital systems. In a series of experiments, bound-
edly rational agents representing firms created complex multi-layered systems through a series
of product development decisions. The simulated firms responded effectively to overall indus-
try conditions as well as to the different kinds of opportunities presented by different product
categories at different times. Although firms that managed to establish platform ownership
early in an industry’s evolution tended to earn the lion’s share of profit, later application de-
velopers did surprisingly well because they were able to exploit the greater diversity of niches
available in the deeper regions of an expanding design hierarchy. The power this afforded to
application developers, in turn, induced platform owners to restrain their efforts to extract
value through architectural control. While the industry-level results must be interpreted with
care—particularly the finding that more relaxed control leads to deeper and more profitable
architectures—they draw novel attention to the relationship between system architecture and
industry performance, the nature of which warrants further study in future work.
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